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Michael F. Keiver* The Pacific Salmon War: The
Defence of Necessity Revisited
In 1994, frustration with the Pacific salmon dispute between Canada and the
United States, caused the Canadian government to impose a transit fee on
American fishing vessels. The author reviews the legality of the measure vis-a-
vis three legal regimes: the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, the
defence of countermeasures, and the defence of necessity. In addition, the
effectiveness of retaliatory measures are examined in viewof recent developments.
The author concludes by recommending a two-track strategy: an alliance with
NativeAmerican groups as well as environmentalnon-governmentalorganizations.
En 1994, legouvernementcanadiena impos6 des frais de transit a des vaisseaux
de p~ches am6ricains, suite aux frustrations entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis au
sujet du conflit du saumon du Pacifique. L 'auteur critique la l6galit6 de la mesure
parrapport a trois regimes juridiques : la conference des Nations Unies surle droit
de la mer, la d6fense des contre-mesures, et la defense de n6cessit& De plus,
I'efficacit6 des mesures de represailles est examin6e en tenant compte de
developpements recents. L'auteur conclut en recommandant une strategie 6
deux volets: une alliance avec des groupes autochtones am6ricains ainsi que des
organismes environnementaux non gouvernementaux.
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Introduction: A Bellicose Spirit
Is this want of national pride?
No, it is want of a bellicose spirit that would seek
to impose its ideals on any other people.
We have other fish to fry, and they are
fish we catch in our own waters.'
Canada has proven that it has a bellicose spirit by its recent actions in
the salmon dispute with the United States. In 1997, hundreds of Canadian
fishermen blockaded the Alaskan tourist ferry, Malspina, for three days
in the port of Prince Rupert, British Columbia, to protest the Alaskan
fishing fleet catching salmon which they considered Canadian.2 In an
effort to gain leverage, the government of British Columbia announced
the cancellation of the seabed lease for the Canadian Forces' Base at
Nanoose Bay where there is a military testing range frequented by
American naval ships.' In addition, the Canadian government began the
1. R. Davies, "Literature in a Country without a Mythology" in The Merry Heart: Selections
1980-1995, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1996) at 47.
2. A. Zagorin, "Kettle of Fish" Time (4 August 1997) 20-21. Chris Wood, "Darn Yankees"
Maclean's (4 August 1997) 12-17.
3. R. Howard, "B.C. Cancels Military Lease" The Globe and Mail (23 May 1997) A-I, A-4.
The province has jurisdictional control over the seabed, but the actual waters at Nanoose Bay
are under federal control. U.S. nuclear submarines use the site under the terms of ajoint defence
agreement. The cancellation would take full effect six months after notice. Another retaliatory
action considered by the provincial government was to disrupt the flow of the Columbia River,
which passes from Canada into the United States and is used for the generation of hydro-
electricity.
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enforcement of a hailing protocol that resulted in the subsequent arrest of
four American ships.4
The dispute erupted after the collapse of negotiations to resolve the
four-year deadlock on the division of the Pacific salmon catch under the
terms of the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty. The main controversy con-
cerned the increased American interception of salmon as they swim
through Alaskan waters to Canadian breeding grounds. Frustration over
the talks provoked the Canadian government into taking retaliatory
actions. In 1994, the government imposed a transit fee on American
fishing vessels passing through Canadian waters. Despite American
outrage at these measures, they can be justified under the international
law doctrine of the defence of necessity.
The first part of this article examines the defence of necessity and its
role in the development of international environmental law. Second, the
legal and environmental issues resulting from the Pacific Salmon Treaty
are analysed. Third, the legality of the 1994 transit fee is reviewed vis-a-
vis three legal regimes: the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea
(LOSC), the defence of necessity, and defence of countermeasures. The
paper discusses the question of whether the defence of necessity contin-
ues to be effective in the context of the current salmon dispute. Part four
of the paper suggests a two-track strategy which would involve a
Canadian alliance with Native American groups as well as environmental
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). There are indications that
these two options are presently being either considered or attempted by
the Canadian government. Recently, a legal opinion was drafted for the
Canadian government by Garvey, Schubert and Baker, a Washington,
D.C. law firm, which advised that Canada should pursue a legal action
jointly with an Indian band in order to ensure standing in a U.S. court.'
Regarding the second option, Canadian Fisheries Minister David Ander-
son, recently met with several American environmental groups to discuss
4. Four American ships were seized, fined $300 each, and allowed to resume passage. The
regulations came into effect last year but only recently began to be enforced. The protocol
requires that foreign fishing boats must radio hello or stow their fishing gear below decks when
entering Canadian waters. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, News
Release No. 91, "Canada Takes Action Following Deadlock in Salmon Talks" (21 May 1997).
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, News Release NR-HQ-97-28E, "Fisheries Officials Arrest
Three U.S. Fishing Vessels" (26 May 1997). See also, R. Howard, "No sign of truce in Pacific
salmon war" The Globe and Mail (29 May 1997) A-4; R. Howard, "Canada plans to slash
salmon quotas" The Globe and Mail (28 May 1997), A-4); and M. Cernetig, "Canada seizes
U.S. boats" The Globe and Mail (27 May 1997) A-3.
5. W. Cox, "Injunction could stop Alaskan over fishing, Canada told" The Globe and Mail,
(14 November 1997) A-4. The law firm's document, dated July 22, 1997, also advised that an
injunction would include a restraining order that could immediately force the Alaskans to stop
fishing for up to 20 days.
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the salmon dispute.6 The article also proposes that Canada should
convince the environmental NGOs to apply pressure on their respective
governments in order to remedy the overexploitation of salmon by the
Alaskan fishing industry. This could be achieved via the procedures
available under the North American Agreement on Environmental Coop-
eration (also known as the NAFTA side agreement on the environment).
I. The Defence of Necessity and International Environmental Law
The defence of necessity has been used in the past to justify a number of
unilateral conservation measures which normally would be considered
contrary to international law. In 1893, the Russian Imperial Government
issued a decree that prohibited the hunting of seals in an area outside
Russian territorial waters. The measure was invoked to avert the total
extermination of seals by British and American hunters. The Russian
government justified its actions because of the absolute necessity of
taking action prior to the imminent opening of the hunting season. More
importantly, the Russian government emphasized the provisional nature
of its action and proposed the negotiation of a permanent solution to the
problem. Robert Ago, in his presentation on the defence of necessity to
the International Law Commission, argued that the Seal Fisheries Offthe
Russian Coast case was a valuable example because not only did it
illustrate the concept but also the strict conditions needed to be present in
order to invoke it.7
A more recent example of a conservation measure being justified by
the doctrine is the Torrey Canyon incident. In 1967, the United Kingdom
bombed a Liberian oil tanker, Torrey Canyon, in international waters in
order to prevent further pollution of the British coast. Even though the
British government did not claim any "legal" justification, it did rely on
the doctrine of necessity. It had emphasized.that the danger was extreme
and the decision to bomb the tanker was made only after other methods
had failed. Indeed, efforts to disperse the oil with detergents had failed,
as had an attempt to salvage the vessel. The bombing was successful
6. B. McKenna, "Anderson seeks U.S. allies in fish war" The Globe and Mail (4 December
1997) A-9. At a briefing session held at the Canadian embassy in Washington, the Fisheries
Minister met with representatives of several groups including the American Rivers Associa-
tion, Audubon Society, Friends of the Earth, American Sports Fishing Association, Natural
Resources Defence Council, World Wildlife Association and Trout Unlimited. This was the
second time in four months that the Minister met with American environmental groups
regarding the current salmon dispute.
7. R. Ago, "State of Necessity", Summary records of the meetings of the thirty-second session,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1980, Vol. 1,5 May - 25 July 1980, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A (1980).
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because it burned off the oil before it could spread. This action was
generally accepted because neither the flag state nor the ship's owner
protested.8
The International Law Commission commented on the Torrey Canyon
incident and concluded a state of necessity can be invoked "by way of
exception, in order to avert a serious and imminent danger which, even
if not inevitable, is nevertheless a threat to a vital ecological interest,
whether the conduct is adopted on the high seas, in outer space or-even
this is not ruled out-in an area subject to the sovereignty of another
state."9 More importantly, the United Nations Convention on Law of the
Sea recognized this type of action in Article 22 1:
Nothing [...] shall prejudice the right of States, pursuant to international
law, both conventional and customary, to take and enforce measures
beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual or threatened damage
to protect their coastlines or related interests, including fishing, from
pollution or threat of pollution following a maritime casualty.
It can be argued that the necessity principle is no longer presently
applicable because of recent developments in international law. Never-
theless, the evolution of international law depends on the creation of
customary law that is largely formed by the international practice of
states. Therefore, without states occasionally "pushing the envelope" of
international law, it would not evolve. Secondly, as with domestic law,
despite legal institutions and regimes being created, there are always new
situations that challenge the established norms. The question that should
be asked is whether there is an accepted legal norm that still remains
applicable to the particular case or should the envelope be pushed once
again? A useful example of this approach is Canada's Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act, 10 passed in 1970, establishing a pollution
prevention zone to a distance of 100 nautical miles from the coast of
Canada. Rather than a full-scale claim to sovereignty over the waters, it
enabled Canada to immediately protect the Arctic marine environment.
At the time, nevertheless, international legal norms considered this an
illegal extension of jurisdiction. The Canadian government emphasized
that it was acting not in the breach of international law but on behalf of
the international community in the absence of applicable law." It is
8. P. Kirsch, "Canadian Practice in International Law" (1994) 32 Can. Y.B. Int'l. L. 303 at
312.
9. Ibid. at313.
10. R.S.C. 1970(1st Supp.), c. 2.
11. I. Head & P. Trudeau, The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada's Foreign Policy, 1968-1984
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995) at 25-64.
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significant that the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference later acknowledged
the Canadian principle of Arctic environmental protection and incorpo-
rated the concept into Article 234 of the 1982 Law of the Sea treaty. 2
This evolutionary approach to international law was argued during
Canada's east coast fishing dispute with the European Union (EU). The
Canada-EU dispute had come to a climax with the arrest of the Spanish
vessel Estai outside the 200-mile zone. In what became known as the
turbot war, the Canadian government also attempted to justify its actions
by invoking the defence of necessity. The criteria enumerated by various
jurists to assess the validity of this defence included:
1) An essential interest of the state has to be in peril;
2) The peril must be grave and imminent;
3) The action taken by the state is the only one that could safeguard
its essential interest;
4) The action has not gravely prejudiced the interests of the state
against which action was directed;
5) The action is temporary in nature;
6) The action taken is limited to what is strictly necessary to face the
peril; and
7) The state relying on necessity has not contributed to that
necessity. 3
The use of force, in arresting a foreign vessel, remained an open question
even under the doctrine of necessity. Yves LeBouthillier has argued that
the International Law Commission was unable to resolve this issue, and
therefore, the United Nations Charter could apply:
According to many people, the UN Charter allows resort to force in only
two cases: self-defence, and actions under the authority of the Security
Council. Even if we concede for argument's sake that necessity constitutes
another exception permitting force, a state would have a hard time
establishing that force was the only means open to it, given the clear
obligation of states to resolve their disputes peacefully."
This may be considered significant criticism of the Canadian action
because it was not clear that Canada had explored all the options available
for a negotiated settlement rather than to take unilateral action against the
12. M. Keiver, "The Turbot War: Gunboat Diplomacy or Refinement of the Law of the Sea?"
(1996) 37 C. de D. 543.
13. R. Ago, supra note 7; Y. LeBouthillier, "Can Canada Plead Necessity in Seizing the
Spanish Trawler?" The Globe and Mail (16 March 1995) A-23. Y. LeBouthiller, "L'affaire du
Turbot" Le Devoir (13 April 1995) A-9. J.A. Beesley & M. Rowe, "Sound Basis in
International Law for Canada's Action in the Turbot War" (1995) 1 Can. International Lawyer
177.
14. Y. LeBouthillier, supra note 13 at A-29.
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Spanish vessel. Therefore, it could not be said that the action taken was
the only one available in order to safeguard its essential interests. A
further weakness regarding Canada's ability to invoke the defence of
necessity was whether it had contributed to the state of necessity. It can
be argued that Canada had created the state of necessity by forcing a last
minute divisive vote regarding an unacceptable turbot quota upon the EU.
Furthermore, it could be considered that Canada had contributed to the
state of necessity by itself engaging in overfishing previous to the specific
dispute. 5 Unfortunately, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will
probably never rule on the legality of the Canadian defence since Canada
invoked a reservation vis-A-vis the jurisdiction of the court to hear the
dispute. 16
II. The Inequity of the Equity Principle: The Pacific Salmon Treaty
The treaty has its slightly pathological aspects.
It is governed by a theoretical framework not unlike
the "mutual assured deterrence "policy that prevailed
between the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War period.7
Fraser River sockeye salmon has beenjointly managed by Canada and the
United States since the 1930s as the result of the United States-Canada
Convention for the Protection, Preservation, and Extension of the Sock-
eye Salmon Fishery in the Fraser River System (known as the Fraser
River Convention). Despite the treaty, during the 1950s one of the first
salmon wars erupted because of the interception of the valuable pink
salmon stock on the Fraser River (the original agreement only related to
sockeye salmon). The Canadian Fisheries Minister responded to com-
plaints from fishers by suggesting that Canadians "wipe their noses, pull
up their socks and catch a comparable number of Puget Sound [U.S.] pink
salmon.""8In 1957, the Fraser River Convention was amended to include
pink salmon. Several decades later, Canada realized that although the
15. M. Keiver, supra note 12 at 573.
16. Spain challenged the legality of the Canadian reservation to the ICJ. In a split decision,
however, the court ruled "it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate" the matter. Paul Koring, "Hague
court won't rule in Estai case", The Globe and Mail (5 December 1998) A- 1l. See also, Paul
Koring, "Ottawa awaits decision on 1995 fisheries dispute" The Globe and Mail (4 December
1998) A- 16. Erin Anderssen, "Canada's 1995 torbot war heads to court today" The Globe and
Mail (9 June 1998) A-5. Dennis Bueckert, "Turbot war leads to trouble with Europe, World
Court" The Globe and Mail (15 June 1998) A-3.
17. T. Glavin, Dead Reckoning: Confronting the Crisis in Pacific Fisheries (Vancouver:
David Suzuki Foundation/ Greystone Books, 1996) at 43.
18. P. Larkin, Pacific Salmon: Scenarios for the Future 20 (1980), cited in R. J Schmidt, Jr.,
International Negotiations Paralysed by Domestic Politics: Two-Level Game Theory and the
Problem of the Pacific Salmon Commission" (1996) 26 Environmental Law 95 at 100.
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direct costs of the Fraser River salmon fisheries were equally divided
(such as enhancement programs), the indirect costs were not. These
indirect costs were the opportunity costs of foregoing the hydro power
developments as well as stricter pollution regulation and control. There-
fore, it could be argued that while the Americans received 50 per cent of
the Fraser River sockeye and pink salmon, they did not bear the true costs
of maintaining a viable fishery. 19
The Canadian reaction to this situation was an increased interception
of chinook and coho salmon of American origin. In 1970, both countries
realized that negotiations would have to be entered into regarding all
Pacific salmon species: sockeye, coho, chinook, pink, and chum. A treaty
would have to include salmon not only from the Fraser River but also
from all other rivers in British Columbia, the Yukon, Oregon, Idaho,
Washington and Alaska. The negotiators recognized it would be impos-
sible to eliminate transboundary interceptions, however, they attempted
to devise a formula that would result in a mutually beneficial division.
The Canadian delegation proposed what became known as the equity
principle. Ironically, the equity principle was defined differently in two
international agreements, LOSC and the Pacific Salmon Treaty. The
equity principle was also known as the state of origin principle during the
LOSC negotiations. The state of origin approach emphasises that the
salmon belong to the state where the salmon are produced. Canada
managed to gain U.S. support for this principle during the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) because the
Americans were also concerned about high seas interception of salmon
by third countries. This approach was adopted and became incorporated
into LOSC Article 66: "States in whose rivers anadromous stocks [such
as salmon] exist shall have the primary interest in and responsibility for
such stocks."2 °
Unfortunately, given the protracted fifteen years of negotiation that
resulted in the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, the equity principle became
distinct from the LOSC approach. This modified version became incor-
porated into Article III, paragraph 1 (b) of the Treaty: Art. 1. "With respect
19. G. R. Munro & R. L. Stokes, "The Canada-United States Pacific Salmon Treaty" in
D. McRae & G. Munro, eds., Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law
of the Sea (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1989) at 21.
20. Ibid. at 24. LOSC, Article 66. Conversely, it could be argued that LOSC Article 56(l)
allows the coastal state sovereign rights regarding the exploitation, conservation and manage-
ment of living resources in the exclusive economic zone (the area beyond and adjacent to the
coastal state's territorial sea). Nevertheless, Article 56(2) also requires that in exercising its
rights within the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state shall have due regard to the rights
of other states.
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to stocks subject to this Treaty, each Party shall conduct its fisheries and
its salmon enhancement programs so as to ... (b) provide for each Party
to receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in
its waters."'" Even the term "benefits" required further definitions as
there are two types of benefits. The first consists of benefits resulting from
post-treaty enhancement and conservation programs; the second con-
cerns "residual" benefits. Both parties have agreed with the concept of
post-treaty benefits, but the residual benefits issue still remains contro-
versial. The residual benefits formula would have to determine what was
equitable in view of established interception patterns. The Americans
knew that if their Fraser River interceptions were counted they would be
in a deficit position. They argued that their interception was sanctioned
by the long-standing Fraser River Convention whereas the more recent
Canadian interceptions of American chinook and coho were not yet
sanctioned by a treaty.22 Unfortunately, the equity issue was left to be
resolved in the future according to the Memorandum of Understanding
attached to the Treaty:
In order to implement the equity principle, each country must estimate the
value of the salmon it produces that are harvested by the other country.
Because the countries currently lack sufficient data on the value of the
intercepted fish, the equity principle will be implemented through a phased
approach, as data is gathered.23
III. Anatomy of a Salmon War: The 1994 Transit Licence
It's time to scrap showboat diplomacy and
use every legal means available to us.
- Alan Beesley,
former Canadian Ambassador for Marine Conservation24
From 1985 to 1992, the number of American interceptions of Canadian
salmon increased from 6 million to 9 million, while Canadian intercep-
tions of American salmon decreased from 5 million to 3.5 million.25
Moreover, Alaskan interceptions of Canadian-origin salmon had in-
21. Treaty Between Canada and the United States of America Concerning Pacific Salmon,
18 March 1985, Can. T.S. 1985 No. 7, [hereinafter Pacific Salmon Treaty] at Article 3.
22. Munro & Stokes, supra note 19 at 25.
23. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 21 at Memorandum of Understanding Regarding
Implementation of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, 28 January 1985, Implementation of Article III,
para. 1 (b).
24. "Canada: Net losses" The Economist (20 June 1998) 38.
25. T. L. McDorman, "Canada's Aggressive Fisheries Actions: Will They Improve the
Climate for International Agreements?" (1994) 2 Canadian Foreign Policy 12.
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creased from 3 to 5 million.26 The Canadians believed that they were
being punished for practising better conservation measures while the
Americans had profited with increased interceptions without foregoing
commercial development which had damaged the U.S. salmon rivers.
In 1994, Canada realized there would be little progress made on the
equity issue because of the nature of U.S. representation on the Pacific
Salmon Treaty's Commission. Competing interests among the members
from the States of Washington, Oregon, Alaska and representatives from
Native American organisations made it difficult to achieve consensus on
the American side. This was further complicated by each representative
having a veto. The previous pressure tactic of aggressively fishing
Washington and Oregon-origin chinook and coho salmon in retaliation
for Alaskan interception of Canadian-origin salmon had become less
effective because these stocks had greatly diminished. In June 1994, the
Canadian Fisheries Minister, Brian Tobin, announced that a CAD $1,500
transit licence fee would be imposed on all U.S. commercial fishing
vessels crossing selected inside water passages along the British Colum-
bia coast. This licence would affect about 300 U.S. fishing boats that use
the waterway to travel from Washington and Oregon to harvest salmon
in Alaskan waters. 27
1. The Legality of the Transit Licence and LOSC
Past analyses of the legality of the transit licence have examined two
major international law regimes. The first analysis questioned whether
the Inside Passage was an internal water or part of Canada's territorial sea
where the right of innocent passage applies according to LOSC Article
8(2).2' The second analysis argued that even if this action was illegal it
could bejustified by the defence of countermeasures. 29 The first analysis
involves whether the waters between the British Columbia mainland and
Vancouver Island, known as the Inside Passage, can be considered an
internal water. Obvious internal waters are internal seas, lakes, rivers and
closed bays. Generally, for coastal waters to be recognized as an internal
water, baselines are employed to determine if the waters are located
26. Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Press Release, Backgrounder (April 1994)
in Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Press Release, Licence Fee Announced For
U.S. Vessels (9 June 1994).
27. Ibid.
28. T. L McDorman, "The West Coast Salmon Dispute: A Canadian View of the Breakdown
of the 1985 Treaty and the Transit Licence Measure" (1995) 1 Loyola L.A. Int'l. & Comp.
L.J. 477.
29. C.B. Picker "Fishing for Answers in Canada's Inside Passage: Exploring the Use of the
Transit Fee as a Countermeasure" (1996) 21 Yale J. Int'l. L. 349.
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within the landward side of a baseline. The baseline method of determin-
ing internal waters is outlined in LOSC Article 7:
In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there
is a fringe of islands in the immediate vicinity, the method of straight
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.30
Although most of the channels in the area of the Inside Passage would
qualify as internal waters, there remains the question if two channels, the
Queen Charlotte Strait and the Strait of Georgia, are too large to qualify
as internal waters.3 If the two large channels cannot be considered part
of internal waters, then LOSC Article 17 would apply which affirms the
right of innocent passage. Moreover, Article 26 of LOSC forbids the
imposition of any fee by a coastal state on ships engaging in innocent
passage."
A possible LOSC defence is provided under Article 21 which allows
restriction of innocent passage if the regulation or law is in respect of "the
conservation of the living resources of sea."33 Furthermore, according to
Article 25, it could be argued that the passage of the American vessels is
not innocent, and therefore, the "coastal State may take the necessary
steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent" such
as the imposition of a fee or licence. The only caveat to this defence is
whether the fee is applicable only to U.S. fishing boats or to all foreign
vessels passing through those waters. If the fee were only applicable to
American vessels, it would be discriminatory and contrary to Article
24.
4 There has been some debate whether the licence fee only applied to
U.S. fishing boats. Nevertheless, it has been concluded that American
vessels were previously exempted from requiring permission to use the
Inside Passage and that other foreign fishing boats would also be required
to obtain a licence to enter Canadian waters.35
2. The Defence of Countermeasures and the Transit Licence
As outlined above, there is some uncertainty regarding the legality of
transit licence vis-A-vis the Law of the Sea Convention. The defence of
countermeasures has been suggested as a possible justification for what
may be considered an illegal action. The International Law Commission
commented on the nature of countermeasures:
30. LOSC Article 7, paragraph 1.
31. Ibid. at 373.
32. LOSC Article 17 and 26, paragraph 1.
33. LOSC Article 21, paragraph. 1(d).
34. Picker, supra note 29 at 377.
35. McDorman, supra note 25 at 497-498.
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While most writers believe, on the basis of well-known jurisprudential
dicta, that lawful resort to countermeasures presupposes internationally
unlawful conduct of an instant or continuing character, a few scholars
seem to believe that resort to measures could be justified even in the
presence of a bona fide belief on the part of the injured State that an
internationally wrongful act is being or has been committed against it. 6
It has been suggested that the transit licence action met the required
conditions for the defence of countermeasures.37 The conditions and
limits have been summarized as follows:
a. There must be a violation of an international obligation causing
injury to a state (or at least a good faith belief to that effect by the
allegedly injured state).
b. A countermeasure cannot be taken until the injured state has
demanded cessation of the wrong and redress for the injury.
c. The countermeasure must be directed to ending the violation and
obtaining redress for the wrong and not to an outcome extraneous to
the violation.
d. The countermeasure must not be disproportionate to the violation
and injury suffered.
e. The countermeasure must not involve the use or threat of force
contrary to the UN charter.
f. The countermeasure must not violate international law obliga-
tions for the protection of human rights or peremptory norms of
international law. 38
The criterion of a prior breach of international law could be argued by
Canada since it believes that the U.S. has not respected its obligations vis-
A-vis the Pacific Salmon Treaty and LOSC Article 66. Canada also made
prior requests for cessation and redress for injury. The requirement that
countermeasures be directed or narrow in scope can be justified by the
narrow application of the transit fee to only commercial fishing vessels.
Moreover, the transit fee was proportional to the problem in question and
only affected those directly involved in the particular activity of salmon
fishing. Regarding the use of force, Canadian officials limited their force
to what was necessary to enforce the transit licence requirement. Lastly,
there was no evidence of human rights or other fundamental international
legal norms being violated as a result of this countermeasure.
36. "An internationally wrongful act as a precondition," Documents oftheforty-thirdsession,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1991, Vol. 11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1 991 /
Add. I (Part 1).
37. Picker, supra note 29 at 382- 387.
38. 0. Schachter, "Dispute Settlement and Countermeasures in the International Law
Commission" (1994) 88 Am. J. Int. L. 471 at 472-73.
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3. The Defence of Necessity and the Transit Licence
Interestingly, the defence of necessity may be more appropriate regarding
the transit licence dispute than the defence of countermeasures. The
fundamental distinction between these two concepts was illustrated in
memorandum written by the Legal Bureau at the Canadian Department
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:
Unlike self-defence and countermeasures, which also preclude wrongdo-
ing, the operation of the doctrine of necessity does not presuppose the
existence of wrongful act committed by another State whose right is
infringed by the State acting out of necessity. In circumstances of neces-
sity, the other State may be innocent or guilty.-9
The first condition of countermeasures requires that there be wrong-
doing on the part of the other state. Despite the allegations of not
respecting their engagements under the Pacific Salmon Treaty and LOSC
Article 66, Americans could deny wrongdoing on the basis of the
vagueness of these undertakings. With regard to the Pacific Salmon
Treaty, the concept of equity remains undefined. Regarding LOSC,
neither the United States nor Canada has ratified the Convention despite
much of it being now accepted international customary law.
Therefore, the concept of necessity is more applicable because it does
not require wrongdoing but only a state of necessity. The critical state of
salmon stocks could be characterized as an essential interest in peril that
is grave and imminent.40 Regarding the criterion that the action taken by
the state is the only one that could safeguard the essential interest, Canada
could argue that applying pressure in the form of a transit licence was the
only option available in order to restart stalled negotiations. The U.S.
could not argue that their interests were gravely prejudiced by this action
especially if balanced with the prejudice that Canada would have suffered
if salmon stocks were further depleted. The action was temporary in
nature and only used in a method to persuade the other parties to continue
negotiations. Moreover, the action taken was limited in scope since the
licence fee only applied to commercial fishing vessels. Nevertheless,
Canada would have to prove that it did not contribute to the state of
necessity by overfishing its salmon stock.
39. Memorandum dated April 19, 1994, Kirsch, supra note 8 at 312.
40. A significant criticism of this approach would be that some salmon stocks are in peril
whereas others are not. For example, the Canadian Fisheries Minister recently announced a
coast-wide ban on coho fishing because it is considered endangered. See C. Sankar &
M. Cernetig, "Ottawa bans B.C. coho fishery" The Globe and Mail (22 May 1998) A- 1, A-3.
This would make the general application of a transit fee on all salmon fishing vessels difficult
to justify.
The Pacific Salmon War: The Defence of Necessity Revisited
Despite the legal debate regarding which defence doctrine is appli-
cable vis-a-vis the imposition of the transit licence fee, the practical
application of these defences has largely been rendered ineffective by the
recent amendment to the U.S. Fishermen's ProtectiveAct ofl967(FPA).4'
The effectiveness of a measure, such as a transit fee, has been largely
blunted by the 1995 Congressional amendment to the FPA which permits
the reimbursement of "illegal" transit fees imposed on American fisher-
men. The amendment also allows the American Secretary of State to
request a reimbursement from the offending country. Furthermore, the
amendment empowers the President to place similar conditions on the
offending state's vessels. In view of this amendment, Canada's future
options have become more limited insofar as they involve the imposition
of direct fees on American fishermen. Despite alternative measures such
as the cancellation of a military lease or trade sanctions, these measures
encourage American reactions such as linkage of the salmon dispute issue
to unrelated issues. For example, in reaction to the announced cancella-
tion of the naval seabed lease, a U.S. Senator has threatened to cancel the
American participation in the $100-million environmental clean-up of
former NORAD radar stations in northern Canada.4 2 Nevertheless, the
1994 transit licence fee was successful insofar as it led to Vice-President
Al Gore's direct intervention. In return for removal of the transit licence
requirement, the Vice President promised Canada that the U.S. would
reverse the trend of intercepting Canadian salmon, that it would regulate
its fishery to protect sensitive stocks, and that a renewed salmon treaty
would cover more than a single year.43
IV. The 1997 Salmon War and a Two-Track Strategy
The Queen and the Pope are pretty eminent persons too...
But they wouldn't be able to solve the salmon issue either
if they had to work with this treaty.
-Robert Wright, a former Canadian
Commissioner of the Pacific Salmon Treaty'
41. Codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 1980a - 1980b (West Supp. 1998).
42. G. Gibson, "Volleys in the salmon wars" The Globe and Mail (22 July 1997) A- 13.
43. K. Gram, "Canada catches concession in salmon scrap" Vancouver Sun (3 July 1994)
B-I, cited in McDorman, supra note 28 at 496.
44. R. Wright, who recently resigned from the Pacific Salmon Treaty Commission, com-
menting on the appointment of two "eminent" persons: David Strangway, a former University
of British Columbia president, and William Ruckelshaus, a former chief of the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency. They were appointed in order to find a solution to the ongoing
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Despite the assurances of the American Vice-President, the outstand-
ing issues of increasing interceptions and a lack of an "equity" definition
still remained unresolved for another three years. In 1996, a New Zealand
mediator, Christopher Beebe, produced a report that was rejected by the
Americans.45 Although the report was not released to the public by
mutual consent, a Canadian newspaper, The Globe and Mail, obtained a
copy. The newspaper's account suggests that the mediator largely agreed
with the Canadian demand for a more effective application of the equity
principle.46
The failure of mediation resulted in a number of legal actions: the
injunction and damages suit by the Alaskan government regarding the
ferry blockade, a counter suit by the fishing industry,48 the suit filed by
the B.C. government seeking damages for U.S. overfishing,49 and a
request for an injunction to block the Nanoose testing site cancellation. 0
dispute. Quoted in M. Cernetig, "Salmon treaty member resigns" The Globe and Mail
(11 September 1997) A-I, A-12. On January 12, 1998, they released their report which
suggested that Canada was justified in insisting on an *equitable share of salmon, however, it
could not expect its full share. They also recommended that the two governments should
attempt to negotiate two agreements: a two-year agreement and a long-term agreement. See
R. Howard, "Ottawa softens salmon line" The Globe and Mail (13 January 1998) A- 1, A- 17.
45. "Salmon war on two fronts" The Economist (28 June 1997) 36.
46. Fisheries and Oceans Canada, News Release NR-HQ-95-46E, "U.S. Agrees to Mediation
on Pacific Salmon" (9 May 1995). J. Simpson, "Americans have a lot of vetoes when it comes
to salmon" The Globe and Mail (27 November 1997) A-26. Beebe proposed three methods of
"remedial action": "the adjustment of an intercepting fishery, the expansion of an existing (or
creation of a new) enhancement program and cash payment."
47. Alaska Attorney-General Bruce Botelho asked a Federal Court of Canada judge in
Vancouver for damages to cover losses caused to the ferry service, estimated between $2.5
million and $3 million. See, R. Matas, "Alaska ups ante over salmon" The Globe and Mail
(29 July 1997) A- 1, A-4. See also R. Howard, "Court orders U.S. ferry freed" The Globe and
Mail (21 July 1997) A-I, A-4.
48. The United Fishermen and Allied Workers union [B.C.] filed a suit in a Canadian Federal
Court which alleged the Alaskan government has been systematically over fishing Canadian
salmon for years. See "B.C. fishermen retaliate against Alaskan government" The Globe and
Mail (8 November 1997) A-14.
49. The B.C. government has filed a suit in a Seattle federal court that alleges the aggressive
Alaskan interception of Canadian salmon violates the Treaty's principles of conservation and
equity of harvest. The suit, cosigned by B.C. fishing interests, seeks damages in excess $350
million to be paid to Canadian fishers. Furthermore, the suit seeks a court order certifying that
the U.S. has violated its international obligations, and therefore should compel the U.S. federal
government to force compliance. See R. Howard, "B.C. sues U.S. oversalmon haul" The Globe
and Mail (9 September 1997) A-1, A-4.
50. The Canadian federal government filed a suit in the Supreme Court of British Columbia
to prevent the B.C. government from cancelling the lease on the basis that the termination
would violate an international defence treaty with the U.S. The Canadian government also
threatened to expropriate the seabed area if B.C. cancelled the lease. See S. Feshuk and
R. Howard, "Suit may torpedo B.C. ploy" The Globe andMail (15 August 1997) A-1, A-7. Also
R. Howard, "Ottawa seeks ways to squelch B.C. fish fight" The Globe and Mail (10 July 1997)
A-l, A-4.
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On January 22, 1998, Alaska offered that it would withdraw its suit for
the ferry blockade if Canadian fishers would cancel their counterclaim
and promise never again to blockade a ferry. The Canadian government
agreed to these terms and as part of the settlement it will spend $2.7
million promoting tourism in both B.C. and Alaska.5'
The very international nature of the dispute would have made one
government reluctant to enforce a court decision against another country
even if the court had jurisdiction. Moreover, there remain the constant
calculations of leverage and linkage. The limited possibility of a litigated
solution requires a review of the effectiveness of an action that could be
justifiedby the doctrine of necessity. The recent amendment to Fishermen's
Protective Act, however, seems to have largely blunted the utility of a
measure such as a transit fee. The doctrine of necessity is still relevant
because of the dire nature of the situation, nevertheless, the opportunity
to take effective unilateral measures seems limited.
1. Track One: An Aboriginal Alliance
The bellicose spirit displayed by British Columbia's government has
been criticized for its lack of strategy in building a coalition against
Alaska. A more successful method would be a two-track strategy of
joining forces with environmental non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and Native American fishing organizations. As mentioned at the
outset, it has been suggested that Canada pursue a legal action with an
American Indian band.
52
Indeed, the Native American fishing groups probably have been the
most effective in using the court system against Alaskan intransigence.
In 1995 Pacific Northwest tribes, with Canada and the states of the
Northwest as amici curiae, sought a preliminary injunction in American
federal district court in order to close Alaska's southeast chinook fishery.
Alaska tried to have the suit dismissed on the grounds that the court did
not have jurisdiction to enforce the Pacific Salmon Treaty. The judge
responded that the issue was not whether that court had treatyjurisdiction,
but whether Alaska had violated the settlement that, in part, resulted in
Native Americans becoming members of the Pacific Salmon Treaty
Commission. Thejudge concluded that the settlement issue concerned an
issue of contract interpretation, and therefore, the court had jurisdiction.
Moreover, thejudge granted an injunction which prevented the fishing of
51. "Salmon stand-off' The Economist (31 January 1998) 38.
52. See note 5 for a discussion of the legal strategy.
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the 55,000 chinook salmon by the Alaskan members of the Pacific
Salmon Treaty Commission.53
The Canadian Fisheries Minister at the time, Brian Tobin, had filed an
amicus curiae brief that outlined the Canadian perspective on the joint
chinook rebuilding program, established as part of the Pacific Salmon
Treaty. The brief also described the conservation measures, such as a
50 per cent catch reduction, that Canada had taken to protect the chinook
salmon and documented the potential impact of Alaska's unilateral
plans. 54 Interestingly, the current Canadian Fisheries Minister, David
Anderson, does not appear to have formed any alliances with Native
Americans.
2. Track Two: Environmental NGOs and NAFTA
The second part of the two-track strategy is to gain the support of
American environmental NGOs. The ability of Canada to gain the
support of foreign environmental groups appears to be a characteristic
that was present in past situations which required unilateral measures. For
example, when Canada enacted extraterritorial powers, such as the Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act and the amendment to the Coastal
Fisheries Protection Act (which extended its jurisdiction beyond 200
miles in order to protect straddling stocks), it emphasized the temporary
and urgent nature of the environmental protection and received environ-
mental NGOs' support for its actions. Canada's ability to build a consen-
sus among environmental NGOs has increased with time, and currently,
the Canadian Fisheries Minister is seeking to gain support from American
groups. 55
A possible solution to the ongoing crisis is to seek the support of
American and Canadian environmental NGOs in order to lobby their
governments to revise or use more effectively the international legal
frameworks available to resolve this crisis. For example, the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), known
as the NAFTA environmental side agreement, provides for the participa-
53. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldrige, 898. F. Supp.
1483-84, (W. D. Wash. 1995), cited in Picker, supra note 29 at 368-369.
54. Fisheries and Oceans Canada, News Release NR-HQ-95-95E, "Canada Plans to Support
Legal Proceedings Against Alaska" (7 August 1995). Fisheries and Oceans Canada, News
Release NR-HQ-95-98E, "U.S. Court Decision Prevents Alaskan Chinook Fishery"
(II August 1995). Fisheries and Oceans Canada, News Release NR-HQ-95-105E, "Tobin
Welcomes U.S. Federal Court Decision" (8 September 1995). Fisheries and Oceans Canada,
News Release NR-HQ-95-107E, "Tobin Comments on U.S. District Court Decision on
Alaskan Chinook Fishery" (12 September 1995).
55. See note 6 for more information regarding the Canadian efforts.
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tion of NGOs. In fact, NGOs can make submissions to the treaty
Secretariat asserting that a party country is not effectively enforcing its
domestic environmental law.56 The Secretariat, however, has consider-
able discretion in whether to proceed to a finding of fact. Indeed, this
process has been criticized because very few of the NGOs submissions
have triggered the Secretariat to order a finding of fact.57
Criticism of the NAFTA environmental side agreement has resulted in
a task force, headed by Maurice Strong, to review the role of the
commission and its alleged lack of assertiveness.58 One of the most
difficult obstacles to overcome is the exclusion of natural resource
management from NAAEC review. Interestingly, even though the
NAAEC's preamble excludes resource management, it also requires that
these activities "do not cause damage to the environment of other States
or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. "19 Therefore, the
agreement could apply to activities such as overfishing if that activity
causes damage to the environment of another state. Moreover, the
NAAEC provides for remedial measures such as monetary penalties and
trade measures. 6
Interestingly, there have already been two submissions to the Secre-
tariat by Canadian and American NGOs regarding the alleged destruction
of salmon habitat by B.C. Hydro dams.6' In 1997, the Canadian govern-
ment successfully argued the matter was the subject of a pending judicial
or administrative proceeding, and therefore, the Secretariat could not
proceed further with a finding of fact according to NAAEC Article
14(3).62 In 1998, however, in response to a request from environmental
groups, the Secretariat called for an investigation into whether Canada
56. K. Raustiala, "The "Participatory Revolution" in International Environmental Law"
(1997) 21 Harv. Env. L. Rev. 549. See also, K. Raustiala, "International 'Enforcement of
Enforcement' under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation" (1996)
36 Va. J. Int'l. L. 721.
57. Alanna Mitchell, "NAFIA rejects complaint" The Globe and Mail (8 April 1997) A-4.
58. Four-Year Review of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation:
Report on the Independent Review Committee, released June 1998, online <www.cec.org>
(visited August 1998).
59. Preamble to the NAAEC [13 September 1993].
60. Annex 34: Monetary Enforcement Assessments and Article 36: Suspension of NAFTA
Benefits.
61. C. Mclnnes, "Protest enrages B.C. minister: Activists seek NAFA censure of power
agency for harming fish" The Globe andMail (3 April 1997) A-4. See also A. Mctlroy, "Canada
may face NAFTA probe" The Globe and Mail (21 May 1998) A- 1, A-3.
62. Registry of Submissions of Enforcement Matters, SEM-97-01, and Response from
Canada (21 July 1997), online <www.cec.org>. See also Mcllroy, ibid. at A- 1; this is the first
time that Canada has been investigated in the history of the environmental agreement. There
has been only one other occasion when the Secretariat ordered an investigation: the Cozumel
port development in Mexico (the U.S. has never been investigated).
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was enforcing its domestic environmental laws to protect fish habitat.
The result of the investigation will be a finding of fact and a "factual
record" (at least two of the three NAFTA countries' environmental
ministers had to agree for the investigation to proceed: the Canadian
Environment Minister, Christine Stewart, agreed).63
It is ironic that British Columbia's salmon habitat policies were
challenged by NGOs via the NAAEC mechanism since a significant
amount of destruction to salmon stocks was caused by the past commer-
cial and hydro developments of the salmon rivers in the American
northwest. This underscores a limitation of the NAAEC, in that it cannot
retroactively condemn past practices. Nevertheless, to its credit, the B.C.
government recently cancelled the Kemano Completion Project, a hydro-
electric project that would have destroyed the salmon habitat of the
Nechako River.64 Despite the NAFTA environmental agreement's dire
need for reform, there remains a significant role for NGOs to play in the
long term resolution of the salmon dispute. In conclusion, despite all the
possible pitfalls of this approach, there is an existing legal framework,
albeit in need of reforming, to resolve the salmon dispute.65
Epilogue: The 1998 Coho Accord
It was because Mr. Anderson acted to protect coho
that he was called the Anti-Christ.
It was because Mr. Anderson talked reason with Washington state
that Mr. Clark [B. C. Premier] called him a traitor.
Mr. Anderson tried to talk sense to the Alaskans, too, to no great effect.66
The need for creative and aggressive environmental diplomacy be-
came apparent during the negotiations for the 1998 coho agreement
between Canada, Washington State and Alaska. The Canadian Fisheries
Minister, David Anderson, was faced with a tsunami of anger and
criticism from B.C.'s fishing industry for not consulting with the provin-
63. P. Knox, "Stewart votes to probe enforcement of fishery laws" The Globe and Mail
(30 June 1998) A-3. Environmentalists have also requested an investigation into three mining
operations in B.C. See C. Sankar, "Probe three B.C. mines on dumping, groups say" The Globe
and Mail (3 July 1998) A-4.
64. Fisheries and Oceans Canada, News Release NR-HQ-95-18E, "Tobin Responds to
B.C.'s Cancellation of Alcan's Kemano Completion Project" (23 January 1995). M. Cemetig
& A. Gibbon, "B.C. makes peace with Alcan" The Globe and Mail (6 August 1997) A-I,
A-5, B-1, B-4.
65. One possible pitfall: Canada may not request consultations, a Council meeting, or a panel
for the benefit of any government of a province not included in the declaration [see NAAEC
Annex 41(3)]. B.C. has not signed the declaration.
66. T. Glavin, "Salmon's sea change" The Globe and Mail (18 July 1998) A-1, A-3. See also
R. Howard, "Fish pact 'half a deal', says Clark" The Globe and Mail (27June 1998) A- 1, A-2.
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cial government during negotiations. 67 The Canadian Fisheries Minister
had already announced a coast-wide ban on fishing for coho prior to the
negotiations. 68 Nevertheless, Mr. Anderson sought and received ap-
proval from Canadian and American environmental NGOs for his efforts
in protecting the coho salmon from extinction.69
The one-year coho agreement concluded between Canada and Wash-
ington state permitted Washington state fishermen 24.9 per cent of Fraser
River sockeye or 1.25 million fish at the then current run projections. This
is considered to be more in percentage terms than the 17.7 per cent share
the U.S. fishermen have caught, but less in absolute numbers. In return,
Washington state agreed to restrict fishing to the period between July 27
and August 21 which would protect sensitive early sockeye runs as well
as endangered coho salmon. Washington state's coho catch will be
reduced by a modest 22 per cent or perhaps 7,000. The Canadian
fishermen are faced with a total fishing ban for Coho. 71
Alaska, however, refused to cease its interception of migrating coho
and to make concessions during the negotiations. 7' Alaska's negotiators
steadfastly refused to accept there was a crisis in their own waters during
negotiations. This tactic was later exposed as a negotiating bluff less than
two weeks later when Alaska Governor Tony Knowles declared western
67. B.C. Premier Glen Clark announced that the provincial government plans to resume its
lawsuit against the U.S. for overfishing as well as sue the Canadian federal government for
allegedly violating its written agreement with the province to manage the west coast fishery
jointly. Mr. Clark also asked the federal government to impose retaliatory transit fees on U.S.
boats. R. Howard, "Clark fires new salvo in fish feud with Ottawa" The Globe and Mail
(15 July 1998) A-3.
68. C. Sankar, supra note 40. See also J. Simpson, "Will Canada's coho ban shame Alaska,
or will summer be hostile?" The Globe and Mail (27 May 1998) A-18. The entire
500-kilometre Strait of Georgia has also been closed for sockeye fishing. See R. Howard,
"Sockeye ban hits sports fishery in Strait of Georgia" The Globe and Mail (16 July 1998) A-7.
69. Fisheries and Oceans, News Release NR-HQ-98-25E, "Minister Anderson Writes to U.S.
Conservation Groups on Coho"(1 5 May 1998); S. Blore, "Environmental groups support coho
measures" The Globe and Mail (3 July 1998) A-4.
70. B. Laghi & S. Blore, "New salmon deal a sellout, Clark says" The Globe and Mail (4 July
1998) A- 1, A-5; R. Howard, "Fish war ends with a 'bad deal' as restrictions strand boats" The
Globe and Mail (9 July 1998) A- 11. Interestingly, a month after the agreement was signed there
was an unexpected discovery of about one million sockeye salmon heading towards the Fraser
River. See R. Howard, "Surprise discovery revives B.C. fishery" The Globe and Mail
(19 August 1998) A-I, A-3.
71. R. Howard, "Salmon talks with U.S. Collapse" The Globe and Mail (10 July 1998) A-5.
See also D. Benton (Deputy Commissioner, Alaska Fish and Game), "Canada's Perspective
on Pacific Salmon: Long on Rhetoric, Short on Facts" (1997) online <www.state.ak.us/local
/akpages/FISH.GAME/geninFo/hot/oped.htm>.
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Alaska a disaster area because of the collapse of salmon stocks.7 2 The
crisis should be considered a signal event to Alaska: all salmon species
are intertwined and a more global conservation effort is needed. The
admission by Alaska that there is a salmon crisis allows the NAAEC
Secretariat the needed legitimacy to become involved in this seemly
intractable problem.
72. State of Alaska, News Release 98-205, "Knowles Declares Western Alaska Fisheries
Disaster" (30 July 1998). The Alaskan Governor asked for a $19-million (U.S.) program of
federal and state emergency relief for 8,000 families in fishing communities. It was reported
that salmon catches in Bristol Bay were estimated at 9.7 million fish this year, compared with
44 million three years ago. Alaskan officials refused to admit overfishing was the cause of the
collapse, instead they blamed changes in ocean conditions. R. Matas, "Alaska discovers
salmon crisis, seeks disaster relief for fishery" The Globe and Mail (I August 1998) A-7.
